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tain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellowmen on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to so do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference.

They saw that to live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery. This constrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duties beforehand and know the penalties of transgressing them.

RICHARD HOOKER,
Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, 1594.

AN AMERICAN IDEA OF A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By JAMES L. TRYON, Ph. D., Cambridge, Mass.

WHAT is the American idea of a league of nations? Who can say? One can tell what *an* American idea of a league of nations is with more confidence than he can state what *the* American idea of it is. The attitude of the United States Senate has shown that no American, not even the President himself, can with certainty, beforehand and uninstructed, assure other nations what kind of league his entire country, or the political party of which he is the leader, will unqualifiedly accept. But of several plans of a league we may say, "This is or was *an* American idea." We may say it of the original platform of the League to Enforce Peace, because it had a large number of adherents in America. We may say it of the Covenant of the League of Nations, because, though it resembles the outline of a proposed league of the same name that was put forward by the British leader, General Smuts, it was based in part on the plan of the League to Enforce Peace and in part on proposals made by our President, notably, if we are rightly informed, the guarantee of territorial integrity and independence, and was urged by him upon Europe as one of the prime objectives of the war and one of the chief points to be realized in the settlement of peace. We may say it of the Covenant as amended by the Lodge reservations, because they Americanized the spirit of that document by safeguarding the interests of the United States. And we may say it particularly of at least one other important plan that is not so well known as these proposals, but that cannot fail to receive first consideration if the Covenant fails of acceptance and we begin the agitation for world reconstruction anew. This plan was offered by the American Institute of International Law in its *Recommendations of Habana Concerning International Organization*, January 23, 1917.

The plan of the American Institute of International Law may be called the historic plan of the world-peace movement for international reconstruction, because it represents a continuity of thought and development on this subject from the beginning. The proposal for better international organization is not new and we must not let it appear to be; it has a long and honorable history which is sometimes overlooked. The new element in it is not in its aim, which is peace with justice, but in new methods of accomplishing its aim. A plan for a congress and court of nations, arbitration, mediation, and the codification of international law, although in some of its aspects primarily European, was elaborated by William Ladd, founder of the American Peace Society, and presented to the crowned heads of Europe before most of our public men were born. Substantially this plan, based on past political experience in the life of nations, but adapted to the growing needs of the times, was in process of general acceptance through the action of the Hague conferences, with which it harmonized. But it has also corresponded with the foreign policy of the United States, from the days of Washington through a succession of Presidents and Secretaries of State. Secretary Root, in our own time, urged upon the Amer-

ican delegates to the second Hague conference this continuous development of the peace idea and, with the success of the Supreme Court of the United States in mind, outlined in principle what the conference drafted and conditionally adopted as the Court of Arbitral Justice. This tribunal, when instituted by further diplomatic action, was to be a judicial court of arbitration as distinguished from the present Hague court, which, however, was also to remain operative as the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. The system adopted at the Hague was that of a diplomatic-juridical organization, whose crowning feature for our present day was first of all to be a court of international justice. This was always to be ready to try controversies between nations and render judgment on the basis of law; but no internationalized force was to be put at the disposal of the court for the enforcement of its decisions. The nations were supposed to accept these decisions in good faith, and, furthermore, to be moved to accept them both because of the justice which they proclaimed and because of the compelling influence of an enlightened international public opinion which was in process of education.

But with the outbreak of the World War, which the Hague system did not prevent, all thought of reconstruction on that basis was by many earnest and not a few impatient people thrown into the background and another system with new organs, especially an executive department, supported by international force, was proposed as an altogether better idea than that which was said to have failed. This new system, after having various titles in this country and Great Britain, was finally given the name of the league of nations and the Hague was forgotten as if it had never been. But why the Hague system should be so severely condemned, especially when a good part of it would have to be perpetuated in any reconstruction that, short of world federation, for which we are not ready, marked real progress toward peace with justice, it is difficult to understand; and why no mention was made of the Hague conferences, the court of the conventions, even of the convention relating to the regulation of war, the violation of which was an offense to mankind, has never been satisfactorily explained. The Hague system had been useful in preventing armed conflict and, as in the case of Russia and Japan, in ending war when once begun, but it did not pretend to put an end to all war; the very fact that treaties for the regulation of war and the observance of neutrality were made at the conferences showed that the statesmen who participated in them knew that the day of universal peace had not arrived, but that war might in some evil moment return, in which case its cruelties should be limited as much as possible and the rights and duties of neutrals fixed. Let us hope that after we have established the League of Nations, with Geneva as the world capital, and erected buildings at great expense, we shall not within a few years begin another reconstruction that will leave out the name both of the League and the capital as if they and the high ideas which we now associate with them had gone out of our minds altogether. This indeed would be a tragic experience, and let us not look for it; but it cannot help being suggested.

Some publicists and not a few statesmen have de-

clared that if an international force pledged to act in case of emergency could have been summoned, the attack of Austria on Serbia and the invasion of Belgium by Germany could not have happened. But such a force was not wanted or it might have been available. There was neither in 1899 nor in 1907, the dates of the Hague conferences, any more than in August, 1914, a willingness on the part of the family of nations to subscribe to a general agreement to provide for the use of an international army and navy, usually called, or miscalled, an international police. That idea was in the minds of several distinguished publicists who were receiving a hearing, but there was not sentiment enough for it among the governments to put it into the form of law. There were good reasons for this; for since the days of the Holy Alliance, of Metternich and his autocratic allies, international police had been discredited, especially by liberal-minded men. In those days it had been used by reactionary rulers to interfere in the domestic affairs of neighboring States to put down revolutionists who were seeking constitutional freedom and to prevent the growth of national spirit where men of the same race wanted to live under the same flag. The people of Italy and Spain were its victims; the nations of Latin America were, fortunately, saved by the Monroe Doctrine and other conditions from sharing the same fate as their European brothers. Meantime there had grown up a belief that international police permanently organized, whether available as national contingents or as a collective force, under international executive direction, would mean the loss of national independence and sovereignty, which in our day all States have prized; and no nation was willing to put itself in a position to be sacrificed. The idea of a general guarantee of territorial integrity and independence, except by single States for protectorates or weaker States, or by an alliance for temporary purposes, was, as a rule, thought to be impracticable, although there were special cases of permanently neutralized States, like Belgium and Switzerland, that lived under a guarantee of a limited number of nations. International conditions before the war were unfavorable for a general guarantee. A guarantee of the entire *status quo* as the foundation of a new world order was deemed unthinkable by men who realized how unsatisfactory was the map of the world, and especially of Europe, with Alsace-Lorraine in the hands of Germany, with the Balkan peoples dissatisfied, and with other races having dreams of nationality unrealized. And even now a general guarantee is believed by many students of this subject to be a matter about which the United States should be cautious in sharing unless it wishes to send its troops back to Europe to enforce it, although a limited temporary guarantee, such as an assurance to France that if unrighteously attacked, as in 1914, America would go to her rescue, is believed by some statesmen to be feasible.

While, however, the World War was under way and a belief was growing in this country, and in Great Britain especially, though to some extent in other countries, as shown by the organization of societies in France and Holland, that an international force would tend to prevent future wars and should be provided for in the reconstruction of a peace system after the great conflict was over, the American Institute of International Law,

in its *Recommendations of Habana Concerning International Organization*, proposed a plan that was founded upon the historic idea, the development of the Hague conferences, without the sanction of force. The American Institute of International Law is comprised of distinguished publicists, eminent lawyers, former ministers of state, and some judges of the Hague court, elected from the twenty-one republics of Pan America, including the United States. It is therefore a respectable body of authority whose views on international questions deserve consideration. It did not, however, offer its scheme as a finality or as a panacea, but with a certain degree of modesty and open-mindedness put it forth as a minimum basis for discussion of the problems of international reorganization.*

There are certain noteworthy characteristics about this plan and some omissions in it that deserve consideration. But we should remember that it is only a briefly stated basis for discussion; not a detailed draft or treaty. If it were a treaty, or were embodied in a series of treaties, like the treaty with Germany or the Hague conventions, it would be extensively developed. The plan proposes the continuance of the society of nations as an association of independent States upon an equal basis before the law. It does not recognize the primacy of the Great Powers as of right, nor does it name any dependant group of them as they emerge from the World War. The war was not ended when these suggestions were made; but, even if it had been, the theory underlying the plan is that of a reorganization of the whole family of nations on an equal footing. It precludes the leadership of any one State as of right, for example, the right of Russia, because she initiated the Hague conferences, to preside over them through the instrumentality of a Russian chairman, as was the case in 1899 and 1907, to the parliamentary advantage of Russia. The feature of the plan that provides for a judicial union not only admits regularly recognized independent nations to membership, but self-governing dominions that are attached to empires, as is the case with the Universal Postal Union, which is taken as a model. But as the court to be created is a legal rather than a political body, a court of judges and not a congress of delegates, and its rule is to be in accordance with law instead of being subject to expediency; and as the court is likely to be small and representative of the interests of the whole body of States organized in the union rather than of the interests of particular States, this apparent irregularity of membership may offer no insurmountable objection. The plan says nothing about the concentration of the scattered administrative unions at a single capital; but there seems to be no opposition to this idea in principle, provided such concentration is desired. The council of conciliation that would be set up might represent the extension to the family of nations of the principle of the Bryan treaties for the advancement of peace, several of which have been adopted between the United States and other countries, but modifications might have to be made to suit the world as a whole. The plan does not prohibit or renounce the use of force, but it emphasizes public opinion as a sanction. The court itself is not empowered to use force

against a disobedient State. Public opinion, naturally, would command the acceptance of a wise and just decision if hesitancy to obey were shown, and we know that it brings millions of armed men into the field once its sense of right is violated, for, as the World War has shown, nations will rally to the support of right whether there is or is not a previously organized international force already to be summoned to action. This plan says nothing about the Monroe Doctrine, but we should expect a reservation on this point as strong as that which is attached to the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. This plan says nothing about the limitation of armaments—a matter that the Hague conferences did not deal with except in the form of a study of the question and resolutions in favor of the idea of a limitation—but the idea may be taken up whenever the nations are ready to consider it. This plan does not insist upon the registration and publication of all kinds of treaties, nor does it authorize the conferences to consider harmful treaties; and by it no broad inquisitorial jurisdiction is given to the association of States or to any council created to act in case of war or threat of war. But these are matters for development when the nations are quite willing to have their affairs adjusted by an association that is clothed with political and executive as well as judicial power. This plan establishes no system of mandatory or trustee States for conquered colonies, backward States, or weak peoples that need guidance in the management of their affairs; but it does not preclude such arrangement at the proper time. But a more complete form of internationalization than the mandatory system provides, and one that is above suspicion of national advantage gained by territorial allotments made under the peace treaty, may eventually receive public approval. Guarantees of territorial integrity and independence are not found in this plan, but they would more properly come with conditions farther advanced toward world federation than we have actually reached. They belong to an age of general pacification, when nations, great and small, are satisfied with their place in the international system perhaps when they have adopted standardized forms of governments—*e. g.*, republics—if that time ever comes, and when the occasional law-breaker may be served notice that invasion of another State or the imposition of an imperial form of government is likely to meet with international resistance.

The plan of the American Institute of International Law looks forward to a world legislature, but for the present confines itself to a diplomatic conference. It would give power now to recommend and later perhaps to declare law; and it takes a step toward a world executive by proposing an executive committee that shall be charged with securing the ratification of conventions adopted by the conferences and with influencing unity of action among the governments. This committee might be made up at first of the diplomatic representatives of the nations at The Hague or at some other capital; for example, new duties could be conferred upon the Permanent Administrative Council of the present Hague court until a different executive body is established. In other words, the plan is in harmony with the idea of establishing the three usually accepted departments of government—legislative, executive, and judi-

* See inside cover (page 110).

cial—but at present is concerned with the practical question of establishing a system that is adapted to a society of independent States. It assumes, like the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, that these States recognize the principle of solidarity, and that they have respect for law, and that they desire to co-operate, but prefer to remain free. And this is also the historic American peace idea.

The Plan of the Covenant of the League of Nations

The plan of the American Institute of International Law, the historic American plan for reconstruction, was not, however, adopted by the Peace Conference at Paris, although necessarily some of the principles contained in the new plan are inherited from the past. The Covenant of the League of Nations was based upon the scheme devised and interpreted by General Smuts, who represented Great Britain, but contained new matter which had the approval of some eminent publicists in this country and elsewhere, as, for example, Article 10, as well as additions, that have been attributed to the President. Some details must also have been suggested by various members of the drafting committee, although we are not told by what members.

As first proposed, this plan was both warmly praised and severely criticised here. It was then amended and submitted to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Various reservations, some of them practically in the nature of amendments, were proposed, the most notable of which were associated with the name of Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and are identified with his policy. These reservations were not accepted, and it was impossible to secure a two-thirds majority, as required by our Constitution, to get the consent of the Senate to ratification, either with or without them.

The Lodge reservations help to protect the sovereignty and independence of the United States, but hardly do more than that. They expressly make the action of Congress necessary to participation in war by this country in response to a call from the League, so far as possible prevent Europe, through the League, from interfering with the Monroe Doctrine, or even from interpreting it without our consent, the Covenant possibly being against our exclusive customary claim in this matter; they except from consideration by the League, its organs or other Powers, purely American domestic questions, some of which are specified; make necessary some legislation by Congress with regard to the appointment and authorization of commissions, including in some cases confirmation by the Senate; and require the consent of Congress for certain expenditures that might be involved in our participation in the work of the League, while in case of war or invasion of the United States allow us to increase our armaments at discretion. The reservations restrict the effect on the United States of the extra voting power of Great Britain and her self-governing dominions when either the Empire or the colonies participate in an election or decision of a question upon which votes are taken; and lay down a necessary prerequisite that at least three of the Great Powers that won the war shall accept these conditions. There are also other reservations, one of the most important

of which is the clause relating to the reversions of the rights of Germany in Shantung. These, it is generally admitted, should go back to China, the original owner, instead of to Japan, the conquering possessor, the claims of which nation might have to be defended later by the League and therefore by the United States, if now approved.

But even with the Lodge reservations the general organs of the League and its powers as regards the rest of the world are practically unaffected; its authority to act, and even to intervene in case of war or threat of war anywhere in the world outside the United States, and possibly even here, is practically intact; the enforcement features, the guarantees of territorial integrity and independence, upholding the present *status quo* as the future world order; the system of mandatory or trustee States for weak, backward peoples, or conquered colonies, and the authority to examine and revise treaties, as well as to deal with international situations generally, without, however, restrictions such as might be provided by a declaration of the rights of nations and of individuals; these are all still in the Covenant of the League of Nations. An examination of the Covenant shows that as qualified by the Lodge reservations it has not been destroyed, as many people have thought, but has simply been Americanized, and even now is far in advance of the basis proposed by the American Institute of International Law, and therefore of the historic American program for the discussion of world reconstruction.

Under these circumstances it is a question whether from the point of view of those who prefer the Covenant to the historic American plan, or to any other plan, there has not been a first-class mistake made in opposing the Lodge resolutions and one that it may take years to correct, for sentiment for the naked Covenant itself seems to be waning in this country every day. Doubtless refusal to accept the Lodge reservations was due in part to a fear that if the United States were permitted to put them on the Covenant other nations might ask for reservations of their own until by process of amendment the constitution of the League would be so weakened that it would amount to nothing; but if other countries desire to make reservations the implication must be that not only America, but the rest of the world is being asked to do something reluctantly, and that therefore there is a danger that pledges are being made that will not be kept, which is the very point that, so far as this country is concerned, we should be on our guard against; for we must take no obligation that we do not intend to keep. If we do take upon ourselves obligations and do not keep them, we lay ourselves liable under the terms of the League, as Covenant-breakers, to be invaded or ostracized and possibly ruined by the organized nations of the world.

What May Be Done if the League Covenant Is Not Ratified

If the treaty with Germany, embodying the Covenant, and qualified, so far as the United States is concerned, by the Lodge reservations or their substantial equivalent, is ratified—that is, if we adopt the Covenant in the only form that now seems possible—we shall expect to give the League a fair trial. Such further proposals as are made for international reconstruction may be ex-

pected to take the form of amendments later, for which the Covenant fortunately provides, rather than popular agitation for a new constitution, unless perchance we should have another great war followed by another reconstruction. But nobody can expect an international any more than a national constitution to remain unaltered. A movement especially in the direction of a declaration of rights of nations and of individuals or races, such as may now be found in substance in some of the special treaties made between the Allied and Associated Powers and other nations, but not appearing in the Covenant as applicable to all nations; a discussion of the redistribution of territory, colonial and other kinds, together with claims of some nationalities for nationhood or local independence in a federation and efforts to take the control of the League from a few select Powers in order to make it more strictly democratic and equitable may be expected.

But if the Covenant is lost the movement for world peace will not stop; for it is too great a movement to die as the result of such failure. It is bound to go on and in the end will become more unified than ever before. It will be revived with vigor in due season and new plans for reconstruction, probably of a more moderate character, will be proposed. In case we have to make a new start the plan of the American Institute of International Law, the plan that has historical continuity, which offers many points of agreement and few for controversy, either in this country or among the nations of the world, but from which we have departed in choosing the Covenant, though that document itself reproduces some historic ideas, should be brought to the attention of the governments.

If a new constitution were proposed, it may be assumed that it would not be formulated immediately, but possibly within two or three years, or after the world situation has settled down. In that case it would be easier than it is now to follow the Hague rule and admit all nations to membership at the outset. Such an arrangement might be objectionable to the Powers that are now in control; but if we could agree upon a readjustment, there might be this compensating advantage, in the long run, that the international governments we should set up would be based upon the willing consent of all the nations that subscribed to it, and might be expected in time of crisis to receive loyal support, such as might not be forthcoming under a constitution made by some Powers and at first controlled by them, but excluding others or admitting them in principle, but not in fact, or leaving them for a time as probationers. Whether such new constitution would include the mandatory system, the territorial guarantees of Article 10, which are closely connected with it, a system of enforcement by boycott and the military arm, and an international council in which the Great Powers preponderate as of right; and whether it would confer a world-wide jurisdiction over matters of peace and war, and provide for the revision of treaties may be doubtful, unless the world is ready as a whole to form a political as distinguished from a judicial union, which was what we appeared to be on the point of organizing when the problem of reconstruction was interrupted by the war; but the principles of conciliation, investigation, arbitration, administrative unions, whether separate or concen-

trated at a capital, and the idea of a better organization of the family of nations, together with a wide-spread determination to insist upon respect for law and the rights of nationalities are here to stay.

And what more can we say? Of course, we may be criticized by Europe for hesitating to adopt or for actually rejecting what appeared to be our own idea, a league of nations to secure peace; but it must be remembered that the form which this idea was given in the proposed international constitution of the League of Nations was not the idea of all the American people, and went far beyond our traditional relationship with the rest of the world, much farther than we are all prepared to go at this particular time, but perhaps no farther than we shall be ready to go at a later time. We must not disparage the Covenant as a political achievement from the point of view of securing agreement to a proposed constitution. But the peace question is not one that the machinery of constitutions alone can solve. Conditions as well as constitutions are necessary to world peace. It is a practical question in the solution of which certain international factors have to be carefully considered. The character of nations must be accurately understood. Their policies, motives, standards, and interests must be assessed in the light of history, clearly comprehended and calmly judged.

Have the ethical standards of all the nations been absolutely purified and changed by the war? Is the spirit of empire dead, or has it survived to show itself again in new though less objectionable forms than those of old? And if the thirst for empire still exists, is permanent peace with justice possible? Here is an important consideration. When nations are satisfied with their territory, markets, and commercial privileges; when nationalities that desire unity and justice have been given their rights; when races that seek their freedom feel that they have it, we shall be farther along the road to peace than we are today and in a better position to adopt a constitution of world union based on force. But while there are national spheres of influence in foreign territory, an irredenta to be regained and subjugated peoples to be freed, while rights are withheld against the consent of nations that claim them, can we expect stability, even though we try to fix it in a constitution? And can the United States, without carefully safeguarding its life and its interests, by at least a recognition of the limitations of our own Constitution in regard to participation in war, undertake to guarantee the international *status quo*?

But it will be asked by earnest men who will be greatly disappointed if the United States should refuse to ratify the Covenant, "Shall we remain in isolation and shrink from our duty to help the world?" We cannot remain in isolation. We know that we do not expect to become isolated. We could not separate ourselves from the rest of the world if we would. We shall do our duty in any case. And let no nation think that because we appear to hesitate over the Covenant we shall refrain from cooperation in the interest of our country and the welfare of the world if the same or a similar set of circumstances, such as the unjustified invasion of Belgium or France, should occur. But we want to reserve the right to attend to our own affairs. We are willing to concede the same privilege to other nations. We want

to keep out of the antagonisms of Europe and we want Europe to keep out of our affairs. There has been no substantial change among our people as a whole in regard to those fundamental principles of policy that we received from our fathers and that have proved to make for our peace. If Europe needs us we stand ready to help her, but we prefer to remain free. We are willing to co-operate, but unwilling to be controlled. And we are unlikely for the present to join any union that compromises the independence of the United States or obligates this country to share the control of the world.

THE WAR HAS NOT DESTROYED

VII

The Human Struggle for a Moral Ideal

By ARTHUR DEERIN CALL

COMMON CONCEPTIONS OF THE MORAL IDEAL

IF ONE were to summarize writings dealing with the moral elements of personal success, such a summary, I think, would be seen to consist substantially of four qualities, namely, worship, love, labor, and a creative self-sacrifice. And one must confess that this is an inclusive category.

Reverence

True, we must accept worship as an aspect of any moral ideal, for religion and morality do not differ in kind. If we were to put the matter into the form of mathematics, we might say that morality is to religion as the seed is to the fruit. This is why reverence occupies a place so important in the writings of the moralists. There is a veneration touched with fear when we stand in the presence of beauty, goodness, truth; or when we think upon the Unknown. This is reverence. We shall grant that there is a difference between the forms or rituals and the blood or sinews of real reverence. Not that the forms and rituals are in and of themselves evil; but that in poetry, music, art, behavior, the forms and rituals are but the means to higher ends; that, as Gladstone once put it, "Nothing can make ritual safe except the strict observance of its purpose, namely, that it shall supply wings to the human soul in its callow efforts at upward flight." There is in us a substance of things hoped for; a high human feeling, reaching, for the want of a better phrase, toward the stars; a realization of a weakness supported by an unfaltering strength; a companionship with the poets as "from the naked top of some bold headland" they behold "the sun rise up and bathe the world in light"; an unwordable poem in us when, alone by the sea, or beneath the night sky, or when beholding the wood rose, we love it and leave it on its stalk. This is reverence, the forerunner of worship. The systematization of it has given rise to the religions. When seen in others, it is a beautiful thing; for he who feels it, who is it, unconsciously radiates it. It is the secret of great teachers. The Gamaliels in education all had it. It is an essential fact in the rise of successful States. As Senator Hoar said in his oration on Robert Burns:

"No race or nation will ever be great, or will long maintain greatness, unless it holds fast to the faith in a living God, in a beneficent Providence, and in a personal immortality. To man as to nation, every gift of noblest origin is breathed upon by this hope's perpetual breath. I am not here to make an argument. I only affirm a fact. Where this faith lives are found courage, manhood, power. When this faith dies, courage, manhood, power die with it."

Love

Any moral ideal must include also a systematic growth of those affections which beget kindness in thought and deed. In all the arts much is made of love, of its endurance, forgiveness, trust; of its waiting, suffering, questioning, silence; of its freshness as of the dawn, the sacred perfume of it, its infinity. This great thing of the heart, often winged with fire, is the theme of poetry, of music, and of all the graphic expression of genius. It is the majestic miracle of life. At its best it is the little Eppie entering from out the night to melt the Silas Marner within us. If there be a Savior of the world it is love. It makes homes, schools, and all the personal relations tolerable. It is the one mark of genuine superiority. It is the hope of overcoming competition and conflict with co-operation and justice. It is the only quality in us which gives and which gets in the giving. It takes the "common man" and raises him above the contempt shown in the ancient arts, in the poems of Dante and Shakespeare, and gives to him the place faintly dreamed of by the revolutionists through the long past of aspiring revolutions.

Labor

And labor? Of course, labor. Life depends upon production, transportation, care of the young. These things demand labor. Then, too, there is in all healthy individuals an instinct for a personal perfection, a moral self-development calling for cleanliness in body and behavior, for strength and kindness, all of which demand application and industry. This is true not only of the principal things, but of the petty details, the unseen behaviors which bring neither praise nor recognition. This instinct says to us that we must rise above envies, jealousies, foolish prides, shams, gloatings over the misfortunes of others, even of our enemies. This perfection, demanding much labor, is seen to be good will; not a silly thing, but that good will which is sane enough to make a stern decision, if need be; a good will which can look to the welfare of others with self-forgetting generosity; a good will that finds greatness in little things:

"I have owed to them,

In hours of weariness, sensations sweet,
Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart,
. . . feelings, too,
Of unremembered pleasure such, perhaps,
As have no slight or trivial influence
On that best portion of a good man's life,
His little, nameless, unremembered acts
Of kindness and of love."

If we are to attain unto that perfection which understands the other fellow, which bases judgments upon facts seen in their right relations; if we are to overcome